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STUDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THE UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
DIEGO L. VILLARREAL*
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The purpose of this paper is to provide general guidelines which will
exemplify the limits and effects of basic student constitutional rights and
their relationship with the university's disciplinary committee.
Generally stated, the purpose of the university is "to impart and to
advance the boundaries of knowledge." Inherent in reaching its educa-
tional goals, is the administrative duty and power to forestall and control
student conduct which will "impede, obstruct or interfere" with its
mission. On the other hand, the students have a corresponding duty not
to interfere with the educational process of teaching and learning, or in
any manner to impose on the university's efforts to advance and expand
the horizons of knowledge.' It is now generally accepted that the uni-
versity has inherent power and authority to make reasonable rules for
governing the university and that the student is obligated to obey such
rules if they are reasonable and closely relevant to the university's ed-
ucational undertakings. 2 Although the university's rule making power
has judicially been recognized, the court insists that such regulations
constitute a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion vested in the
university's administration. A key to what constitutes "reasonable reg-
ulations" is that regulations and rules which are necessary to maintain
order and discipline have always been judicially considered reasonable.'
This, however, does not mean that the university may require a student
to surrender his constitutional rights as a condition precedent to attending
the university.' On the other hand, enrollment does not grant any priv-
ilege, immunity, or special consideration to the student; and most assured-
* Assistant Professor of Government, Texas A.&M. University.
1 Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights, and Responsibilities, 54
Col. L.R. 27 (1966).
' Golberg v. Regents of University of California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App.
1st Dist. 1967), 363 F.2d 749 (9th Cir., 1966).
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ly, it does not vest him with the right to disrupt the educational process
or violate his fellow student's constitutional rights.'
In today's society, education is an indispensable necessity; however,
attending a public university is not a "right per se but is a conditional
right." Students who meet the scholastic standards and whose conduct is
not inconsistent with the university's educational process may exercise
the right to obtain an education. 6 This right once vested-upon ad-
mittance to the university-may not be divested without "due process."
This constitutional requirement is limited in that only "the rudimentary
elements of fair play" need to be observed. Such "fair play" is fluid and
flexible for it is to be determined on a case by case basis.7
While the university must comply with the elementary principles of
"procedural fair play," it is not essential nor mandatory that it adopt
all the formalities and niceties enjoyed before a court of law. The courts
will not interfere, if the university proceeds in a sound, fundamentally
fair, and reasonable manner. s
Then, as a general rule, provided the procedural requirements are met,
a university has inherent general power to maintain order and to formulate
and fulfill its function of imparting knowledge and it may exclude from
its campus those who are detrimental to its well-being.' On the other
hand, the university, like all other public institutions, is subject to the
United States Constitution and federal and state statutes.' 0
The States' educational agencies and boards, as arms of the state, are
not exempt. Therefore, a citizen-be he a student, teacher or professor-
may not be required "to shed his constitutional rights at the university's
gate."" It has long been established that the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States prohibits the States from denying
or infringing upon a citizen's vested rights without due process. Ed-
ucating the youth for citizenship is a highly significant function; but such
education may not be at the expense of the student's constitutional rights.
America cannot afford to teach in its history and political science classes
Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.C., Colo., 1968).
' Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State, 284 F. Supp. 725 (D.C.,
Ala., 1968).
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150-157 (5th Cir. 1961).
8 Jones v. State Board of Education of and for State of Tennessee, 279 F. Supp.
190 (D.C., Tenn., 1968).
9 Id.
"0 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C., S.C.,
1969).
" Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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the principles of American government and outside the classroom discount
them as mere platitudes.' 2 Constitutional rights must exist in fact, not
merely in principle.' 3
While on campus the students remain citizens possessed of funda-
mental rights 4 which under the Fourteenth Amendment university officials
must respect. The university is America's most sacred "marketplace of
ideas"; thus the protection of constitutional rights becomes most im-
perative. 5 The university is a public place, and its dedication to educa-
tional endeavors does not contemplate that the students' rights may be
cut off as if the premises were totally private property. 6 The university
may not become an authoritarian camp.
Even though all constitutional provisions have equal standing, it is
essential to note that some of these rights acquire different limitations and
meanings under different conditions and situations. For example, the
individual oriented rights of the First Amendment have the same judicial
construction whether they are exercised on or off the university's campus.
This is because these rights are individual oriented and remain attached to
him whether he is on or off campus. On the other hand, the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment rights are given a different and opposite con-
struction when claim to them is asserted off campus rather than on
campus. For example, a student who is charged with a criminal offense
is entitled to the protection of the full thrust of "unreasonable searches and
seizures," "the right to counsel" and "a full-dressed judicial hearing.' 1 7
On the other hand, if he is charged with "plagiarism" or "conduct which
disrupts the university's educational atmosphere" he is not entitled to
the full thrust of the above-mentioned rights because university dis-
ciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and constitutional rights are pri-
marily designed to protect the person in criminal cases.
This is not to say that the student is not entitled to constitutional
protection in areas covered by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
Interests affected by these amendments are protected by the "due process
clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment; but the due process standard is
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (1943).
Tinker, op. cit.
"Tinker, op. cit.
' Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.C., S.C.,
1969) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
"Dixon, op. cit.
3
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narrower in scope, for it is limited to affording the student "fundamental
fairness in light of all the circumstances.' '1 8
The importance of these differences is that when First Amendment
rights are in issue, the university has less control of students exercising
their freedom of speech, of press and of assembly in their pristine form,
but has greater latitude when dealing with the procedural aspects of
the disciplinary process. Conversely, the student has complete consti-
tutional protection when exercising his First Amendment rights, and his
right against self-incrimination but a lesser degree in the proceedings
before the disciplinary committee because his constitutional protection is




The university may not prevent, infringe upon, or enjoin a student
from exercising his right to speech, press, or assembly when such right is
being enjoyed in its "pristine form" because to do so would constitute a
denial of his First Amendment rights. 9
The right of freedom of expression, assembly, and right to petition the
government is an indispensible democratic freedom secured by the First
Amendment" which the student may exercise while on or off campus.
The First Amendment "clearly and expressly prohibits any law which
abridges the freedom of speech, press, or the right to assemble and to
petition the government to redress grievances." These rights are not to
be restricted unless and until there is "a clear and present danger of riot,
disorder or immediate threat to public safety, peace and order."'" An
early distinction should be made between these rights in pristine form and
conduct which is co-mingled with them. Conduct which endangers the
orderly educational process is a departure from the First Amendment and
receives no protection under it.22 Therefore, a university rule which
prohibits "parades, celebrations, and demonstrations" without prior uni-
versity approval is a prior restraint on the students' right to freedom of
speech and assembly because it prohibits First Amendment rights in their
" Buttny, op. cit.
Hammond, op. cit.
20 Jones, op. cit.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
' Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 494 (1965).
4
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pristine form, for the prohibitions are not limited "to conduct which dis-
rupts the educational environment. '" On the other hand, participation
in and instruction of others to commit an illegal act-to block the uni-
versity's administrative building-constitutes an illegal seizure of the
university building because it totally disrupts the activities which are
scheduled to be held in that building. Thus, activity which ends in taking
possession by physical force and paralyzing the mission of the university
is unconstitutional for it is not a lawful means of expression or assembly.24
If the demonstration were peaceful and non-disruptive, it would be
entitled to First Amendment protection.
25
When a student engages in "pure speech" or "symbolic speech" in a
quiet and orderly expression of opinion and is not coupled with disorder
or disturbance it may not be prevented or silenced for fear of a dis-
turbance which has not yet ensued, because such apprehension of future
disturbances is not sufficient to encroach upon a student's vested right of
freedom of speech .2  Before a university official may silence a student,
such a student's "conduct," as opposed to "pure speech," must "materially
and substantially" interfere with the operation of the university's academic
mission.
It has long been recognized that even though "freedom of speech is not
absolute" the state may not restrict a person until his speech presents a
clear and present danger, and that no such danger exists until the speech
produces a "substantive evil" which the government may constitutionally
prevent.2 The court has also held that "a function of speech is to invite
dispute, even though it may be provocative, challenging, and would stir
the public to anger" and to quash such speech would constitute an un-
lawful restriction on the vested right of freedom of speech.2 On the
other hand, speech which tends to incite an "immediate breach of the
peace" may be punished or prevented because it does not have constitu-
tional protection. The use of "obscene, profane, libelous, insulting or
fighting words"3 coupled with an electrifying or heated atmosphere falls
in the category which may be prohibited and prevented because such
conditions are caused by speech which does not fall within the protection
"Hammond, op. cit.
' Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 (1968).SEdwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
28 Tinker, op. cit.
Burnside v. Byars at 749, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
28 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
5
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of the First Amendment. This does not mean however, that a hostile
reception qualifies the speech for censorship. If tension and hostility
emanate from the "audience" rather than the speaker, he should not be
silenced. The speaker is exercising his constitutional right to speak; while
the audience has no constitutional or statutory right to become violent
and cause a breach of peace. If peace and order are to be preserved, the
audience which has no right to breach the peace should be removed so
that the speaker may continue to enjoy his right and the non-hostile part
of the audience to listen."' To silence the speaker would constitute censor-
ship which is repugnant to the concept of freedom of speech. 2
Thus, when students in the exercise of symbolic speech wore black arm-
bands to protest the government's policy in Vietnam and such display was
quiet, passive, and orderly, the school's administrative officials could not
suspend the students from school for violating a school rule which pro-
hibited such armbands. To do so, without the student's "conduct" mate-
rially and substantially interfering with the operation of the school, would
abridge the student's right to freedom of speech.' Certainly the display
of the armbands alone did not present a "clear and present danger" to
the school's educational process. Thus the rule was a prior restraint on
the enjoyment of political expression.
South Carolina State College was, likewise, enjoined from suspending
students who, without obtaining prior approval of the College president,
assembled on campus to express their views as to college policies. Such
assembly, without prior approval, was a violation of the rules of the
College handbook. The court held that speech and assembly could be
limited only "when such rights are gravely abused and thus endanger the
paramount interest" of the university. The rule requiring permission from
the President constituted a prior restraint on the student's First Amend-
ment rights of freedom of speech, the right to peaceably assemble and to
petition the government-the college being an arm of the state govern-
ment-for a redress of grievances.3 4 The "prior approval rule" would
tend to intimidate and to discourage students from enjoying their con-
stitutionally vested rights and this is the precise evil that the First
Amendment prohibits. The First Amendment clearly prohibits laws-or
administrative rules, for they have the same legal effect as laws-that
sl Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1964).
82 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945). Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
8 Tinker, op. cit.
8, Hammond, op. cit.
6
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abridge the freedom of speech, press, or right to assemble. Once such a
right is vested the student is entitled to enjoy his right without meeting
further approvals.
The struggle for the right to print without a license is well engraved
in the annals of American history. Today's courts tend to guard freedom
of the press with keen interest and a licensing requirement to print is
swiftly removed. For example, the court promptly enjoined Troy State
College from suspending Gary C. Dickey, editor of the College's news-
paper, for styling an editorial space "A lament for Dr. Rose," "censored."
Dickey's editorial had been censored because the College president pro-
hibited college student editors from criticizing the Governor or State
Legislators. Dickey's editorial was in support for Dr. Rose, president of
Alabama University, who had come under legislative criticism. The court
ruled that a state may not compel college students to forfeit constitutionally
vested rights as a condition precedent to attending a state-supported in-
stitution, particularly when the student did not, in the exercise of his
constitutional right of freedom of speech or press, "materially and sub-
stantially interfere with requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.""5
The right of freedom of speech may be "pure speech," as the delivery
of a speech; "symbolic speech," as the "wearing of black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War"; or the assembly in a group or parade. How-
ever, regardless of the means selected for expression the "clear and present
danger," "the immediate breach of peace" and "the previous restraint"
rules apply.
In essence, then, the university may not require a student to shed his
constitutional rights as a condition precedent to attending the university.
And the students may exercise their right to freedom of speech, press, and
assembly so long as it remains within constitutional protection or is not
coupled with conduct that materially and substantially interferes with or
disrupts the normal academic and adminstrative operation of the univer-
sity.
CONDUCT NOT PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
General Rule:
The university may make all reasonable rules for carrying out its
administrative and academic mission, and may enforce them by enjoining,
" Dicky, op. cit.
7
Villarreal: Student's Constitutional Rights and the University Disciplinary C
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1971
60 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
disciplining, or expelling students whose conduct materially and sub-
stantially interferes with the administrative process or disrupts the ac-
ademic atmosphere. Student conduct which disrupts the university's
mission is beyond the First Amendment limits and does not have "protec-
tion under the constitutional umbrella."8
The First Amendment right of speech, press, and assembly may not
be exercised in any manner that interferes with or disrupts classes, as-
semblies, libraries, laboratories or the university's administrative process."
There is no authority for the notion that paralyzing the operation-ac-
ademic or administrative-of the university is protected by the breadth
of the First Amendment. Students taking such course of action assume
the risk of disciplinary action or expulsion by attempting to correct their
grievances by conduct and methods that have no constitutional protec-
tion. However, students who are present but do not actually block or
take part in blocking the building entrances are not entitled to punishment
because their speech or assembly does not interfere with the university's
mission and thus is constitutionally warranted.8 s
Disciplinary action on matters of this sort are based on misconduct
and not on criticism of the university, thus such disciplinary measures are
not prohibited. On the other hand, it must be remembered that uni-
versity "officials cannot infringe on the students' right of free and un-
restricted expression when the exercise of such right does not materially
and substantially interfere with requirements of appropriate discipline
in operation of school."89
Additional conduct which is not protected by the First Amendment
and thus is subject to university disciplinary action is "student's marching
and stomping through classroom buildings, clapping their hands, shouting
and chanting obscenities with the admitted purpose of disrupting classes
and to recruit students to join their cause."'40 Likewise, the wearing of
"freedom buttons," may be prohibited. For example, pushing and shoving
ensued, when students tried to pin such buttons on fellow classmates.
Later the throwing of the buttons out the window caused an unusual degree
"' Wright v. Texas Southern University, 277 F. Supp. 110 (D.C., Tex., 1967).
"' Sherry, Governance of the University; op. cit. Rules, Rights, and Responsibili-
ties, 54 Col. L.R. 31 (1966).
"' Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 (D.C., La.,
1968).
'o Dicky, op. cit.
,o Dicky, ibid.
8
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of commotion. This conduct could be prohibited because it collided
with the rights of others and was disruptive of the educational process
and tended to undermine the school's administrative authority4'
Also, conduct which far exceeds the student's right to bring grievances
to the attention of the university officials may be prohibited or controlled
by suspension from the university if necessary. Students had no right to
complain of their suspension when they as demonstrators "displayed their
placards, chanted themes, and deliberately obscured the university's
president's view of a football game by holding a placard directly in front of
his face," and as the demonstrators became more menacing, the president,
the dean and their guests were forced to leave the game; and while leaving,
one of the demonstrators spat into the face of a police officer, others tried
to physically block their exit, while still others beat upon and rocked the
president's car and yet others threw rocks which landed on an officer's face.
It is clear that no sort of disciplinary measures would infringe upon the
student's First Amendment rights to "freedom of speech, peaceful assem-
bly, or petition for redress of grievances. "42
It can never be overemphasized that First Amendment rights do not
constitute "a license to trample upon the rights of anyone else and if
such rights are exercised they must be exercised in a responsible manner
and without depriving others of their rights because the enjoyment of
their right is equally precious."' Students acting beyond the limits of the
First Amendment assume the risk of the consequences which may include
suspension from the university, probation, or any other reasonable dis-
ciplinary measure.
FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
General Rule:
Fourth Amendment rights apply to criminal cases and not to admin-
istrative civil proceedings. Thus, university officers may search, without
a warrant, a student's dormitory room when they have "reasonable cause
to believe" that an illegal act is being committed or that such act may
interfere with the university's academic decorum. "Dormitory rooms are
a university auxiliary in carrying out its academic mission and a student
" Blackwell v. Issaquerra County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1966).
"Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (D.C., W. Va., 1968).
"Rains v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
9
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who takes up residence in such a room does not acquire the privacy or
interest which is protected by the Fourth Amendment.""
Due to their close relationship, although not dependent on each other,
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights will be considered simul-
taneously.
Again it must be emphasized that constitutional rights are not gov-
erned by the same limits of judicial construction. The right against self-
incrimination like the First Amendment rights is individual-oriented and
whether exercised on or off campus is controlled by the same judicial
standard; but Fourth Amendment rights are not, because this amend-
ment controls criminal cases and the nature of disciplinary proceedings
by the university as an administrative agency is civil and not criminal.
The university has no criminal jurisdiction but merely civil jurisdiction
under which it may make all reasonable rules necessary to conduct the
operation of the institution for the purpose which it was dedicated. For
example, if a student is charged with rape, murder, larceny, burglary, etc.,
whether or not allegedly committed within the jurisdictional confines of the
university, the university has no criminal jurisdiction to cope with matters
of this kind. However, if the alleged offense is in conflict with the
university's regulations which are university or academic oriented, then
the university's administrative authority may be invoked. For example,
the university has jurisdiction over plagiarism, and conflicts arising from
violations of dormitory regulations.
Thus, the search, without a warrant, of a student's dormitory room
which is based on sufficient "information to amount to probable cause to
believe" that the student is in possession of marijuana is justified because
the university has sufficient interest in preventing its dormitory rooms
from being used for an illegal purpose or for a purpose which would
seriously and materially interfere with campus order.4 5
The thrust of the Fourth Amendment does not apply because the
student's association with the university is a "special relationship" which
"does not depend on the theory of right to privacy or on traditional prop-
erty concepts." Neither is the relation based on "contractual rights, nor
does the university stand in loco parentis to the student." So the in-
spection is not justified because the student waived or contracted away his
" Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp.
725 (D.C., Ala., 1968).
" Id.
10
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Fourth Amendment rights; but rather its validity rests on whether the
search is a reasonable exercise of the duty regarding the maintaining of
discipline which will insure an educational atmosphere. If the search
meets this test, then it is presumed to be reasonable, even though in
theory, it may "infringe upon the outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment
rights of the student.
46
Dormitories are "auxiliaries of the University which are maintained
and conducted in furtherance of its educational purpose." The student
is not a tenant nor does he have "complete and totally unrestricted rights
of a lodger because the dormitory is not a commercial lodging quarter."
When the student takes up residence in a university dormitory, he im-
plicitly agrees to conform to and to obey all necessary and reasonable
rules adopted by the university designed to promote the general order of
the institution.4" Thus, a student who rents a dormitory from the univer-
sity "waives objection to any reasonable searches." Another well-estab-
lished rule is that "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit reasonable
searches when the search is conducted by a superior who is charged with
a responsibility of maintaining discipline, order, or security."'48
The "reasonable cause to believe test" which justifies a search by uni-
versity officers is lower than the "probable cause" standard used in criminal
law cases. The reason is that the university disciplinary proceedings are
"civil and not criminal in the constitutional sense." With this in mind,
it is easier to see that, even though the student is subject only to reason-
able university rules, "his rights must yield when the exercise of his




Fact-finding administrative investigations may be conducted without
infringing on a "campus organization's" Fourth Amendment rights be-
cause any resulting university action would be civil and not criminal in
nature. The Fifth Amendment is not offended because it applies solely to
natural and not to artificial persons.
The Fourth Amendment does not control when the university is con-
46 Id.
" Englehart v. Serena, 300 S.W. 268 (1927).
Moore, op. cit. United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964).
,9 Moore, op. cit.
11
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ducting a purely fact-gathering investigation. Information from such
an investigation is not used for criminal prosecution purposes. For ex-
ample, in today's revolutionary and rapidly changing times the university
may need to investigate its campus organizations, its established programs
or practices. The desired information may be either for the purpose of
making, repealing, modifying, and amending rules and regulations or for
re-orienting the university's general policies, or for purposes of obtaining
information or evidence with which to settle student disputes. 50
An administrative investigation of an organization, whether or not it
is incorporated, may be conducted if such investigation is for a lawfully
authorized purpose which the State government has power to control.
"Such investigation need not be in response to a particular complaint"
because the investigation is conducted to determine whether rulings or
policies need revision or whether certain campus organizations, or their
officers, are subject to university rulings and, if they are, to determine
whether they were violating such rulings. Records may be requested and
if denied, a subpoena should suffice. The major limitation on compelling
the organization's records to be turned over to the university is that "the
records are relevant to the inquiry.'"" The thrust of this investigation is
to gather facts, but it may culminate in administrative action if the facts
discovered justify filing a complaint. The university has a legitimate
right to satisfy itself that a campus organization's operations are in accor-
dance with the university's rules and regulations ;5 and if not, to order the
required compliance.
The officers of campus organizations generally raise two questions.
First, whether the university is compelling the organizations to give
testimony against themselves? Second, whether the organization may
plead the Fifth Amendment against the university's administrative
process? The answers are "no," because it is the organization that is
being investigated, not the officers in their personal capacity. The function
of the right against self-incrimination is limited to protecting only natural
persons from compulsory incrimination, either through their own testimony
" Rules applied to "Administrative Investigations" are limited to general admin-
istrative rules. For general information of footnotes 50 through 63, and 81
through 93 see American Jurisprudence 2nd Administrative Law, (Reprinted from
Volumes 1 and 2 Am. Jur. 2d) Sections on "Investigations," etc. The Lawyers Co-
operative Publications Company, Rochester, N.Y., Bancroft-Whitney Company,
San Francisco, Calif., 1962.
"Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-209 (1946).
52 Id.
12
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or through personal records.5" Since the campus organizations are artificial
persons, they are not entitled to protection against self-incrimination.54
Thus, students, on a personal basis, may plead the Fifth Amendment,55
but may not plead it in their official representative capacity, even if they
tend to be incriminated.5
In another area where the above issues are raised, the court has held
that all records "required by law to be kept" cease to be private and
become public records. And since the right against self-incrimination is
limited to a person who has proprietary or possessory interest57 in the
requested material, "public records," not being of a proprietary nature
must be made available for inspection upon administrative request.5" Thus
the "records required to be kept by law" rule denies the person who holds
them for the organization the right to claim the right against self-
incrimination.
However, before the university requires records to be kept, the records
must primarily be "for regulatory purposes, of the type that are cus-
tomarily kept, as articles of incorporation of campus organizations, and
must be colored as "public" under the law or rules.59
On the other hand, if a student, and not an organization, is being
investigated, a fishing expedition is not allowed if the thrust of the needed
records or information would tend to incriminate the student of an activity
for which criminal punishment may be meted if he is found guilty of
breaking a law or ruling. The reason is that the records would contain
evidence which would incriminate the student and compel him to give in-
criminating evidence against himself which is strictly prohibited by the
Fifth Amendment. °
Another procedure which may facilitate the universities in gathering
information is using the "immunity bath rule." This rule holds that any-
one who is granted immunity from prosecution forfeits the right against
self-incrimination. If he refuses to testify, he may be cited for contempt.8 '
"' United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
"Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911).
" Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
" Hannah v. Larch, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
"' United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
" Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
" Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
"0 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
"Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 390 (1968); Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62 (1968); Communist Part of the United States v. United States, 384
F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
13
Villarreal: Student's Constitutional Rights and the University Disciplinary C
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1971
66 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
The university may, in the interest of justice, student interest, or ex-
pediency, compel the desired testimony by granting an "immunity bath"
to the student or person concerned. Such procedure will enable the uni-
versity to proceed with its fact-finding mission.
A student is entitled to claim his right against self-incrimination before
an administrative body. The right against self-incrimination is an in-
dividually oriented right and, like the First Amendment rights, the
student may not be denied this right on the ground that university pro-
ceedings are civil in nature and not criminal. This is a vested right and
may be exercised while one is before a university disciplinary committee.
On the other hand, the right to be assisted by counsel in administrative
proceedings does not apply. 2 The reason is that the witness is belore
a fact-finding investigatory proceeding and not before a criminally
"accusatory or adjudicatory body." In essence, no fine or criminal
punishment flows from these investigations. The court is of the opinion
that a witness before an investigatory body is much like one before a
grand jury, where no constitutional right to counsel exists.63
DUE PROCESS
General Rule:
University administrators may not capriciously or arbitrarily dispense
with disciplinary action because to do so would offend the due process
clause provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. Student rights which do
not enjoy specific constitutional protection are protected by the "funda-
mental rudiments of fair play."64
The general guideline in determining procedural "due process" is
that when a public university, as an agent of state government, undertakes
any action which may affect the student's interest or may tend to cause
him injury, the university must provide the student with "fair play." It is
immaterial that a student's interest is classified as a "right or a privilege,"
for the fact is that it is "a vested interest" and such interest enjoys con-
stitutional protection. Administrative due process must not be taken to
mean that students are entitled to a "full-dress judicial hearing." A
judicial type of a hearing coupled with publicity may prove to be dis-
turbing and detrimental to the university for it may disrupt the univer-
82 Hannah, op. cit.
8In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
"Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.C. Colo., 1968).
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sity's educational atmosphere.65 Nonetheless, just because there are no
specific "students' rights" mentioned in the Constitution, it does not mean
that a student may be denied the right of "association with the university,"
or deprived of his liberty or property without due process. The court
has aptly stated, "one may not have a constitutional right to go to Bagdad,
but the government may not prohibit one from going there unless by
means consonant with due process of law."" It is well-established that
the state may not grant a privilege, such as admitting a student to enroll
in its universities, in exchange for the student's surrender of his constitu-
tional right to procedural due process.67
The right to obtain an education is "an interest of extremely great
value." Therefore, disciplinary measures should be based on reasonable
rules; and, action to enforce them may not be arbitrary or capricious.
The courts insist that the disciplinary rules, and their enforcement, be
reasonable because, any other standard may "break a student's spirit and
do inestimable harm to his education."
68
The thrust of administrative "due process"-fair play-is that the
student is entitled to notice of the charge against him, information as
to the nature of the evidence, an impartial hearing, an opportunity to
confront his accusors, and an opportunity to present his evidence and any
explanations.
Some of the more specific judicial requirements that control university
disciplinary hearings are-(a) A written statement of the precise and
specific charges is to be furnished the accused student at least ten days
prior to the hearing; (b) The student must be given the names of the
witnesses against him and be allowed to inspect in advance of the hearing
any evidence, material, affidavits, or exhibits which the university or wit-
nesses will present against him; (c) He must be given reasonable time
to prepare and meet them; (d) The accused may be permitted to have
counsel at the hearing to advise him-but not to represent him; (e) He
must be assured of the right to present oral or written evidence by way
of witnesses, affidavits or exhibits; (f) He is to be allowed to hear his
accusers, see their evidence, question and cross-examine any witness who
presented incriminating evidence against him; (g) The hearing officers
are to reach their decision solely on facts presented at the hearing; and
(h) If the hearing is not before the board of education, a written record
"Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 272 F. Supp. 649 (D.C., Mo., 1967).
o Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy et al., 363 U.S. 886 (1961).
Dixon, op. cit.Dixon, ibid.
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must be made of their findings and the disciplinary measures; (i) The
record is to be presented to the student for his inspection; (j) The court
further holds that the university or the student may, at his own expense,
make a recording of the hearing. 9 But recordings of proceedings before
university disciplinary committees are not necessary to satisfy due
process.7" If these fundamental elements of "fair play" are followed by
the university's disciplinary committee, "the requirement of due process of
law will have been fulfilled."'"
When university rules or regulations provide a student with a right
to a "hearing," careful attention should be given to the exact right to
which the student is entitled. "A hearing may consist of an adjudicatory
proceeding where facts in dispute are tried. At this type of hearing, facts
may be presented, the defendant confronts his accusers and cross-examines
them, and presents summation arguments to the tribunal."7 2 Conversely,
"a hearing may be a proceeding where the only materials presented to the
tribunal are oral arguments. '7 3 The university can avoid unnecessary
criticism of being unfair or arbitrary by providing for a "trial" rather
than for an "opportunity to present arguments." The trial will not only
give the evidence by cross-examination, but will give the administrative
body "answers as to who did what, where, when, how, why, with what
motive or intent.
74
It is quite possible that the one who accuses another may be "malicious
or mistaken or both and distort the true facts." On the other hand, the
accused may know the correct facts and may be successful in disproving
the false or malicious accusations.7 1 If the facts are at issue, the accused
has his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses who
testify against him. 6 Once the right to confrontation becomes a fact, the
tribunal will have the most ideal opportunity to learn the true facts, because
it is at this time that the defendant will bring forth evidence to discredit his
accusers.
77
It is well established that "trials" are time consuming and in the event
"' Esteban, op. cit.
" Esteban, op. cit. Dixon, op. cit.
"' Due v. Florida, 233 F. Supp. 396 (D.C., Fla., 1963).
7" Dixon, op. cit.
78 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Text, 113, West Publishing Co. (1959).
Davis, ibid. 113.
Davis, op. cit. 115-116.
Davis, op. cit. 120.
U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
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of an emergency, a hearing, whether a trial or oral argument, may not be
feasible; therefore, the administrative committee may, without a hearing,
summarily dispense with the controversy. However, the rights of the
students that are caught in the traffic of the emergency must not be con-
sidered settled without a hearing. The emergency rule holds that in the
event of an emergency the administrative body does not have to insure
the students a hearing, prior to the dispensation of the controversy, as
long as the students are given a hearing, even after the passing of the
emergency, but before the final decision of the administrative body is
rendered."8
It should be kept in mind that "the purpose of the hearing is to deter-
mine whether the charges are true" and that "disciplinary proceedings
conducted by an educational institution are not to be tested according
to the niceties of procedure required in a court of law. Thus the demands
of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial stage or at any par-
ticular point . . . so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final
order becomes effective." For example, students were not denied due
process when they were expelled from the university; but subsequent to
the expulsion, and prior to the final decision a hearing was granted to
determine whether or not they were to be readmitted.
79
ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE
The adjudicative procedure is begun with the administrative body's
notification to the student defendant of the charges levied against him.
Notice of "the charges should be made with reasonable clarity" so that
the defendant will be able to adequately know of the charges against him
and will have sufficient time to prepare his defense.80 The notification
should, not only give "reasonable notice" so that the defendant will not
be prejudiced by surprise charges8 ' but also set a date for the hearing
which will give the accused adequate time to prepare his defense. The
hearing date should not be too close to the date the accused was given
notice of the charges against him for it would deprive him of adequate
time to prepare.8 ' On the other hand, it should not be too far removed
in time because memory of facts tend to become blurred as time passes
Davis, op. cit. 120.
North America Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).80 Jones, op. cit.
8 1Kwong Hai Chew ex rel. v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); In re Buck's
License, 232 P.2d 791 (1951), 258 P.2d 124 (1953).
" E.B. Muller and Co. v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir., 1944).
17
Villarreal: Student's Constitutional Rights and the University Disciplinary C
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1971
70 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
and thus may deprive the student of substantive rights.83 The thrust of
"adequate notice" is simply to inform the student of "certain charges" so
that he will not be misled as to exactly what he is being charged with 4
and to insure that he has sufficient time to prepare, so the issue of time
will not be prejudicial nor detrimental to him.
There will be instances when new facts will be discovered subsequent
to the commencement of the hearing. They may be introduced so long
as they are not prejudicial and detrimental to the student, even though
they tend to modify the original charges. If they tend to be prejudicial to
him, then he should be given additional time to prepare."5 The overall
guideline is, therefore, that "the right to a hearing" must mean the right
to a "meaningful hearing" which includes the duty to insure that the
student is aware of matters which include the duty to insure that the
student is aware of matters with which he must contend. 86
A well-established rule is that if the judgment of the administrative
body directly affects the students' rights "in personam," then "the judg-
ment may not be rendered if the administrative body has not obtained
jurisdiction over the student, and, if a judgment is rendered, it is void."87
Therefore, to gain jurisdiction over the student, he must have been given
"adequate and fair notice." 8 If the administrative tribunal has not gained
"in personam jurisdiction," then it may not adjudicate the student's
rights.8" The student may be given "actual-personal--or written no-
tice."9 If the university is proceeding against an organization, notice
may be given to its representatives. 9' On the other hand, if the univer-
sity's notice proves to be defective, but the student or organization repre-
sentative "appears before the administrative unit without challenging the
defect-such as too short notice, he is deemed to have waived his right
to object to lack of adequate notice."9
In essence, the test in determining whether or not a student has been
8 United States Ex Rel. Turner v. Fisher, 222 U.S. 204 (1911). Bronanman v.
Harris, 189 F. 461 (1911).
"Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
"Radio Officers Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1953).
N.L.R.B. v. Waterfront Employers, 211 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1954).
Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
"National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
Oliphant v. Cathage Bank, 80 So. 2d 63 (1955).
oo National Licorice Co., op. cit.
"'Cowan v. State, 116 P.2d 854 (1941). McCarthy v. Cass Head Timber Co.,
302 P.2d 238 (1956).
" Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 13 F.2d 673 (1926).
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afforded procedural due process of law is whether the university officers
have acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or whether they have been funda-
mentally fair in the light of the total circumstances." Therefore, a
student expelled without a hearing was not denied due process when the
university dean personally had seen him on campus after curfew hours
and asked him to leave and he had refused, then asked him to come to
his office and he never came, and later attempted to contact him by mail
but could not because the student did not provide the university with his
address as was required. Subsequently, the Dean visited the student's
father to inquire of the student's address, but could not get it because the
father did not know. Finally, through certified mail, the student was
informed of his expulsion from the university. In this case, the evidence
is clear that the Dean diligently tried to contact the student and to give
him notice but failed, not because his efforts were capricious or un-
reasonable, but because the student failed to cooperate. "The Dean did
all that he could and nothing else could be required." If the court would
reinstate the student, it would amount to condoning the student's
irresponsible attitude and would be disarming the university of authority
to discipline recalcitrant students. Certainly "the constitutional umbrella
should afford no protection to those who choose to go out in the rain
bareheaded."94
On the other hand, the above rule is not to be taken to mean that all
university actions will be upheld by the court if the university officials are
of the opinion that re-admission of an expelled student may undermine
university discipline. The expulsion of a student for violating an un-
constitutional university rule will not be upheld because to do so the court
would be sanctioning state action which abridges "basic rights guaranteed
by our constitution."95 The issue is not whether the student would be
afforded due process, but whether the reason for expulsion is constitutional.
Even if he is afforded due process, the dismissal will be void because it is
based on an unconstitutional regulation.
Due process is also met when the disciplinary committee gives the
student a fair opportunity to prove his innocence, and is careful in ad-
mitting and weighing all evidence, so as not to receive evidence from
" Brahy v. Federal Radio Commission, 61 App. D.C. 204, 59 F.2d 879 (1932).
Seward v. Denver and R.G.R. Co., 131 P. 980 (1913).
' Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (1968).
"Wright v. Texas Southern University, 277 F. Supp. 110 (D.C., Tex., 1967),
off. 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968).
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sources which may tend to be "freighted with prejudice" and then pro-
ceeds to reach a decision with a "calm, objective, open and fair mind." 96
The hearing being a most crucial state of the disciplinary process, the
committee should not take lightly the nature of the evidence, nor its
responsibility of presenting substantial evidence. The university has the
burden of proving the student guilty of misconduct and must be careful
of not compelling the student to prove himself innocent. Thus, when the
university did not present evidence, but solely listened to the student's
evidence for two and one-half hours and on that basis alone expelled 29
students accused of illegally blocking the entrance of the university's
administrative building, such hearing did not meet the "rudiments of fair
play." 9
7
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE NOT ESSENTIAL TO
"DUE PROCESS"
General Rule:
The right to counsel is limited to criminal cases; thus, the student is
not entitled to the "constitutional right to counsel" before a university
disciplinary committee because such proceedings are civil in nature. How-
ever, a student, through due process, is entitled to have counsel advise him
during the hearing, but may not represent him. On the other hand, the
student may not have a "constitutional right" to counsel, but may enjoy
such right "if given by congressional or legislative act or by University
rules and regulations."
Closely related to the nature of the hearing is the issue of whether the
student has a right to counsel in an education administrative hearing.
The court holds that in non-criminal proceedings, investigative and non-
adversarial hearings the right to counsel does not apply, because such a
right is limited to criminal cases and not to civil proceedings." In 1968
the court held that it "knew of no legal authority that required Univer-
sity officials to advise a student involved in disciplinary proceedings of
his right to remain silent and to be provided with counsel."9 " Thus it
appears that the university is not obligated to advise or to give student
involved in disciplinary proceedings the "Miranda Warning."
'° Dicky, op. cit.
Zanders, op. cit.
"Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); 285 F. Supp. 936
(1968).
"' Buttny, op. cit.
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The right to counsel is not a prerequisite to a reasonable and fair
hearing in all types of governmental proceedings.0 ° "The fullest recog-
nition of the great role of lawyers in the evolution of a free society cannot
lead one to erect as a constitutional principle that no administrative in-
quiry can be had in camera unless a lawyer be allowed to attend."'' It is
emphasized that disciplinary hearings before a university committee are
"civil proceedings" and "unless the right to counsel is read into the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which at present is not done,
or is granted by congressional or legislative act" or provided by a univer-
sity administrative rule, such "constitutional" Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is non-existent in disciplinary proceedings. 102 Caution should
be taken in applying this rule, because if the student is afforded the "right
to counsel" by any of the above methods, then the "right" is "vested"
and to deny him such a vested right would infringe on his right to due
process.
The concept of due process is flexible and leaves the university wide
latitude in dispensing with disciplinary measures because "inherent in
the concept of due process of law is the exclusion of the dogmatic applica-
cation of specific rules developed in context to entirely distinct forms of
government action."'03 Therefore, there is no uniform criteria applicable
to all situations. But as has been previously stated, "the touchstones
of the application of due process are reasonableness and fairness in view
of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case." It should be noted
that "judicial law indulges in the presumption that University officials
act reasonably, fairly and in good faith and the student has the burden
of proof to show that his conduct was not arbitrary or capricious."'0 4
However, the university should strive to establish a procedure which
provides for substantial justice and dispense with the notion that "assuring
the students of the minimum elements of due process is sufficient and if
a grievance persists, an appeal to the courts will remedy the administrative
shortcomings." Such a notion is more theoretical and illusory than
factual. It is well known that such is the case "when the amount involved
is small," or conversely, "when the cost of appeal is great."'0 5 The fact
100 Madera v. Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 356 (D.M., N.Y., 1967), 382
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
... In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
... Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (D.C., W. Va., 1968).
... Wasson, op. cit.
... Barker, op. cit.
105 K.C. Davis, op. cit. p. 126.
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that a statute, as in Texas, provides for a new trial in the courts, does
not dispense with the necessity of a proper and legal hearing before the
administrative body. 10 6
CONCLUSION
In today's society, an education is vital and indispensible. Without
an adequate education, students may not be able "to earn an adequate
standard of living, enjoy life to the fullest, or fulfill as completely as
possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens." The students'
academic interest is the "right to remain in the university free from un-
fettering restrictions which may tend to impede his education."'01 7
When student-university interests come into conflict with each other,
they must be balanced and accommodated so that the university may
carry out its academic mission and simultaneously, the student may
pursue his education. Thus, when the student meets the academic stan-
dards and is admitted to the university, "he acquires an educational
interest" which is constitutionally protected by the "due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." However, when he engages in "con-
duct" which substantially and materially interferes with the university's
academic purposes, the student may be disciplined or expelled, as long
as such disciplinary measures are "in accordance with the fundamental
elements of fair play." But, when the student exercises his First Amend-
ment rights to petition the government, speech, press, assembly or the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the university may
not infringe upon them as long as they are exercised in their pristine
form.
In other words, there are not constitutional limitations on an "in-
dividual oriented right," as when the above-mentioned First and Fifth
Amendment rights are exercised in pristine form. However, when the
action is "university oriented," as the disciplinary committee's action in
conducting investigations, hearings, etc., the constitutional protection
is limited to "due process" and the broader protection of the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendments does not apply because the administrative
proceedings are not criminal. Finally, the university may undertake dis-
ciplinary action on all "conduct" which substantially and materially dis-
rupts the university's academic mission.
10 L.A. Darling Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 67 N.W.2d 890 (1955).
107 Dixon, op. cit.
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